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Abstract
This paper develops a real business cycle model with labor market search and matching frictions,
which endogenously links both the cyclical ﬂuctuations and the mean level of unemployment to
the aggregate business cycle risk. The key result of the paper is that business cycles are costly
for all consumers, regardless of their wealth, yet that unemployment ﬂuctuations themselves are
not the source of these costs. Rather ﬂuctuations over the cycle induce higher average unem-
ployment rates as employment is non-linear in job-ﬁnding rates and past unemployment. We
ﬁrst show this result analytically in special cases. We then calibrate a general equilibrium model
with risk-averse asset-holding and liquidity-constrained workers to US data. Also under these
more general circumstances, business cycles mean higher unemployment for all workers. The
ensuing cost of cycles rise further for liquidity-constrained agents when replacement rates are
lower or when workers’ skills depend on the length of (un)employment spells.
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Most often the costs of business cycles are computed abstracting from eﬀects on mean employ-
ment. This typically leads to tiny estimates of the costs of cyclical ﬂuctuations; see Lucas (2003).
In contrast, the current paper points out that models with labor market search and matching
frictions imply an endogenous link between the cycle and both mean unemployment risk and
ﬂuctuations of that risk. In the model unemployment is linked non-linearly to past unemploy-
ment and the job-ﬁnding rate. So when calibrating the Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) model
to match business cycle ﬂuctuations, we ﬁnd notably higher average unemployment rates in
the stochastic steady state than in the non-stochastic steady state. These eﬀects on the means
render economic volatility costly, while the mere ﬂuctuation of unemployment about this mean
is not,1 rationalizing why economic volatility ranks so high on the public’s agenda.2
In this paper, we present a real business cycle model with Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) search
and matching frictions in the labor market. Following inﬂuential papers by Shimer (2005) and
Hall (2005), the implications of this model for unemployment ﬂuctuations have recently received
considerable interest. Yet the model also holds implications for mean unemployment rates and
the costs of business cycles. Our model features two types of agents: a group that is liquidity-
constrained and another group that can self-insure against unemployment ﬂuctuations.3 The
two-group setup serves as a robustness check, since many papers have found that the cycle aﬀects
diﬀerently workers who are liquidity-constrained and workers who have savings; see, e.g., Krusell
and Smith (1999). We calibrate the model to US data and compute the costs of business cycles
for diﬀerent versions of the model with increasing degrees of complexity. We start with a version
in which skills are homogeneous. We then allow for an interaction of skills with the lengths of
unemployment and employment spells in order to accommodate the long-term earnings losses
of displaced workers that have been well-documented, e.g., Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan
1 Following Krusell and Smith (1999), most papers apply the so-called “integration principle.” It states that
eliminating business cycles means replacing all business cycle-dependent risk by its expected value conditional
on idiosyncratic states; see, e.g., Krebs (2007). In our paper, instead, there are mean eﬀects. So the integration
principle typically does not hold.
2 Seventy percent of the respondents in Shiller’s (1997) survey, economists and laymen alike, say that preventing
recessions is important. More than 80% of these agree that smoothing out both recessions and booms is
preferable to having a business cycle. Wolfers (2003) uses surveys on subjective well-being. He ﬁnds that
eliminating unemployment volatility would raise well-being by an amount roughly equal to that from lowering
the average level of unemployment by a quarter of a percentage point.
3 In the terminology of Mankiw (2000), these groups are modeled as “savers” and “spenders,” with no transition
between the groups over time. The asset-holding workers live in large “families” following den Haan, Ramey,
and Watson (2000). The liquidity-constrained live on their own.
1(1993). In both cases, the mean eﬀects are at the heart of the welfare costs that we ﬁnd. The
business cycle induces higher mean unemployment rates, and lower average skills.
The literature typically has taken a stand on whether stabilization merely reduces the correlation
across workers in the unemployment and income risk that they face, or whether stabilization
would also aﬀect the average risks that workers face. In the former case gains from eliminating
the business cycle can arise only through equilibrium eﬀects on prices, while in the latter sta-
bilization can directly reduce the risks that individuals in the economy face; see Atkeson and
Phelan (1994). In the current paper, we take an agnostic view – and let the model decide. We
ﬁnd that it falls into the second category.
Key to the welfare costs of business cycles that we ﬁnd in this paper is the second moment
of job-ﬁnding rates. Job-ﬁnding rates need to be volatile enough to render unemployment as
volatile as in the data. Diﬀerent mechanisms by which unemployment ﬂuctuations are induced
imply a diﬀerent degree of insurance provided to the worker. The setup in Hagedorn and
Manovskii (2008), for example, relies on a generous replacement rate to achieve a small enough
match surplus, which in turn allows the model to generate the right degree of unemployment
volatility. The generous replacement rate, however, leaves a worker almost indiﬀerent between
unemployment and market work merely by assumption – with consequences for the ensuing costs
of business cycles. Alternatively, Hall and Milgrom (2008) have proposed a sequential bargaining
game that can be calibrated to generate the same unemployment ﬂuctuations as in the data and
that does not rely on such a small match surplus. Key is that the worker’s bargaining position
is not directly related to income/consumption streams when unemployed. The welfare costs in
this paper depend on the replacement rate. Relying on the latter two papers’ intuition and
the calibration by Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) allows us to trace out the costs of business
cycles for alternative sizes of the outside option while still retaining the cyclical properties of
the model.4 We view this as important since the implicit replacement income when a worker is
unemployed is diﬃcult to calibrate precisely.
We ﬁnd that workers who have no means to save and self-insure and who obtain, say, only as
little as 10% of their former wage income as replacement income when unemployed would be
willing to give up around 1.2% of their steady-state consumption to avoid the business cycle.
Most of these costs are due to an increase in average unemployment. For replacement rates
4 Mortensen and Nagypal (2007) provide a recent overview of the literature that followed Shimer’s (2005)
observation that the standard Mortensen-Pissarides framework in its standard calibration would not match
labor market ﬂuctuations.
2of 40%, welfare costs fall to about 0.35% of steady-state consumption for liquidity-constrained
workers.5 This is slightly below the costs that the well-insured family has, conﬁrming the result
in Krusell and Smith (1999) that business cycles can be more costly for capital owners than for
liquidity-constrained agents. Most important, however, the higher unemployment risk aﬀects
all workers. Workers with asset holdings are aﬀected two-fold. On the one hand, they also have
higher unemployment than in the steady state, and on the other hand, lower employment means
lower returns to their capital.
We then extend the model to account for the fact that displacement can cause notable earnings
losses for workers even several years after they have been displaced, and that these losses are
higher in recessions; see, e.g., Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993). Krebs (2007), assuming
an exogenous process for these earnings losses, shows that this observation can lead to consid-
erable costs of business cycles. We take up this ﬁnding and allow for two types of skills: good
and bad. In the model it takes work experience to acquire good skills, and these skills are more
likely to be lost when workers become unemployed. Importantly, in our modeling this skill loss
is more likely the longer the unemployment spell is, which means that there is an interaction of
skill losses and the cycle. Skill transitions exacerbate the welfare costs of business cycles caused
by higher mean unemployment.
Higher unemployment rates imply longer unemployment durations, which in turn mean that
workers are more likely to lose their skills oﬀ-the-job (and less likely to gain skills through
long employment spells). This means that besides employment the mean level of skills is also
negatively aﬀected: At a relatively low replacement rate of 10%, liquidity-constrained workers
would be willing to pay 2.20% (relative to 1.2% without skill losses) of consumption to eliminate
the cycle. And even with a 40% replacement income their cost of business cycles is 1.3% – more
than three times as much as in the absence of skill transitions. Interestingly, our results indicate
that the mean eﬀects on the skill distribution (and welfare costs) are considerably larger when
skills are worker-speciﬁc (so workers lose skills slowly when unemployed) rather than ﬁrm-speciﬁc
(they lose the skills immediately).
5 As these results show, there is a negative relationship between the costs of business cycles for the liquidity-
constrained workers and the replacement rate. In the model, higher beneﬁts do not provide better insurance
against cyclical ﬂuctuations in idiosyncratic risk for the liquidity-constrained worker, however. Rather the
association stems from the fact that higher beneﬁts – if paid largely by capital-holders – insure liquidity-
constrained workers against an increase in the average incidence of unemployment.
31.1 Relation to the literature
Krusell and Smith (1999) highlight that the costs of business cycles vary with employment
and wealth status. Unemployed and liquidity-constrained workers face higher costs of business
cycles. For log-utility, they ﬁnd that these costs can run up to 3.6% of consumption. Mukoyama
and S ¸ahin (2006) extend this analysis, allowing for two skill groups. In their model, unskilled
workers are not only subject to a higher mean level of unemployment than skilled workers, but
they also hold less wealth to smooth consumption ﬂuctuations. Welfare costs of business cycles
are about eight times as high for the average unskilled worker as for skilled workers. The share
of agents in the two skill groups does not vary with the cycle. In our paper, in contrast, the
business cycle can aﬀect the composition and the mean level of skills. Our papers also diﬀer
in that in our model there is no transition between the liquidity-constrained and unconstrained
groups.6
Krebs (2003) assumes, and similarly Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2001), that the cross-
sectional variation of idiosyncratic human capital risk increases in recessions and shrinks in
booms for all workers. Eliminating business cycles eliminates this pattern. Both papers ﬁnd
considerable costs of business cycles. Krebs (2007) in turn focuses on the welfare costs of business
cycles when displacement causes long-term earnings losses, and when these losses are bigger in
recessions than in booms, ﬁnding a cost of that component of 0.5% of consumption (for log-
utility). In the current paper, we also allow for cyclical ﬂuctuations in long-run earnings losses.
Yet, unlike Krebs, we do not look at a mean-preserving spread of the risk. In our formulation
earnings losses result from a loss of skills oﬀ-the-job. Yet while average earnings on the job are
lower and earnings losses higher in a recession, part of the costs are oﬀset in booms. The reason
is that booms make it easier for lower-skilled workers to achieve suﬃcient consecutive work
experience to move to a higher skill level. Eliminating the cycle eliminates both the losses and
the gains. Thus, in our paper the mere fact that there is co-movement of earnings losses with
the cycle does not generate costly business cycles. Rather the costs originate in a higher mean
level of unemployment and a lower mean level of skills. Beaudry and Pages (2001) analyze the
welfare costs of business cycles when workers have no incentive to save and when the contractual
structure in the labor market insures existing workers against wage cuts, while workers who are
6 This has two countervailing eﬀects on the size of the welfare costs that we measure. The liquidity-constrained
agents in our model economy are much more severely constrained. While this should raise our estimates of
the welfare costs, we also compare this to a non-stochastic steady state in which the same workers remain
severely constrained and occasionally suﬀer from unemployment, which works in the opposite direction.
4laid oﬀ in a recession enter the labor market at a lower wage level. When we interact the business
cycle with skill transitions, in our paper, too, wages of re-entrants into the labor market are
persistently lower in recessions than in booms. This, however, is due to a loss of skills oﬀ-the-job,
and not merely to contractual reasons.7
In the aforementioned papers, the link between idiosyncratic unemployment and earnings risk
and aggregate risk is imposed exogenously. In a paper closely related to ours, Costain and Reiter
(2005) instead construct a heterogeneous agent economy with search and matching frictions in
the labor market. They ﬁnd that cycles impose an average cost of 0.27%, very similar to
our results for the average worker when we abstract from an interaction of the the cycle with
skills. Shifts in mean unemployment rates are important in their paper as well as in ours.
We discuss these mean eﬀects extensively and distinguish them from the eﬀects coming from
unemployment volatility. Also, we assess the interaction of the business cycle with the skill
distribution, which ampliﬁes the welfare costs of business cycles particularly for the constrained
agents.8 Finally, in independent work, in a very recent paper Hairault, Langot, and Osotimehin
(2008) also exploit the non-linearity of the job-ﬂow equation in matching models. They focus
on risk-neutral workers and constant wages, in which case – giving equal weight to vacancies
and unemployment in the matching function – job-ﬁnding rates are linear in technology and
unemployment rises unambiguously. This is a special case of our model, as we show in the
appendix. More generally, however, mean job-ﬁnding rates will also be aﬀected by the cycle,
depending on the degree of risk-aversion and the degree of self-insurance against ﬂuctuations.
We therefore calibrate a model with risk-averse consumers, capital accumulation and diﬀerent
amounts of asset holdings. In this model, mean job-ﬁnding rates increase but nevertheless
mean unemployment rises above steady state, rendering cycles costly. A further element that
distinguishes our paper from Hairault, Langot, and Osotimehin (2008) is that we assess the
interaction of higher mean unemployment with long-term earnings losses, which can exacerbate
the costs of business cycles.
One of the few other papers in the literature that emphasizes that mean eﬀects can generate
costly business cycles is Barlevy (2004). In an economy with endogenous growth and decreasing
7 For log-utility, Beaudry and Pages (2001) ﬁnd welfare costs of about 1.4% of consumption. They also assess
the dependence of the welfare costs of business cycles on the replacement rate of unemployment insurance,
ﬁnding that the welfare costs of business cycles are 25% (not pp.) higher in the absence of unemployment
beneﬁts.
8 An interesting result in Costain and Reiter (2005), which we do not assess here, is that ﬁscal policy in their
model can reduce the costs of the cycle through cyclical taxation and counter-cyclical deﬁcits.
5returns to investment, he points out that eliminating cycles increases average growth rates. This
growth eﬀect renders cycles costly while consumption volatility per se is not. Mean eﬀects of
business cycles are also widespread, but less discussed, in New Keynesian business cycle models
in which real and nominal frictions imply that ﬂuctuations induce an ineﬃcient utilization of
resources; see, e.g., Levin, Onatski, Williams, and Williams (2005).9
Barlevy (2005) provides a broader overview of the literature on the welfare costs of business
cycles, concluding that business cycles are likely costly – as we do. Lucas’ (2003) survey touches
only marginally on mean eﬀects and arrives at the opposite conclusion.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In our model, mean eﬀects are key for the
welfare costs of business cycles. To prepare the ground, Section 2 dissects these in a simpliﬁed
setup. Section 3 describes our real business cycle (RBC) model. Section 4 discusses the cali-
bration of the model to US data. Section 5 presents estimates of the welfare costs of business
cycles for diﬀerent replacement rates and diﬀerent scenarios for the co-movement of skills with
(un)employment. A ﬁnal section concludes. The Appendix presents further details on compu-
tation of the welfare costs, the calibration for the respective cases, and intuition for the mean
eﬀects in our RBC economy.
2 Mean eﬀects on skills and employment in a simple framework
We start with a simpliﬁed framework, abstracting from capital accumulation and saving, from
ﬂuctuations in wages and hours worked on the intensive margin, and from wage bargaining.
The simpliﬁed model illustrates that in standard labor market models stabilization can directly


















log(ct) if σ = 1.
c1−σ
t
1−σ if σ ≥ 0,σ  = 1.
9 Our results carry over to a New Keynesian setting. An earlier working paper version of this paper assessed
the welfare costs of business cycles in an estimated New Keynesian model for the US.
10 The full model in Section 3 provides an endogenous link between mean employment risk and the cycle.
6The worker is liquidity-constrained and consumes his earnings when employed, w,11 and unem-





w if employed with good skills,
I if unemployed.
Employment, et, evolves according to
et = (1 − ϑ)et−1 + st−1ut−1. (1)
At the end of period t, employed workers will be separated from their jobs with probability
ϑ while unemployed workers, of which there is a mass ut = 1 − et, are matched with a ﬁrm
with probability st. New matches are eﬀective from t + 1 onward. It is important to note that
unemployment and the job-ﬁnding rate enter non-linearly in (1). As a result, we have
Proposition 1. Average unemployment rates will exceed those in steady state12 if (i) average
job-ﬁnding rates do not exceed those in steady state, E {st} ≤ s, and if (ii) job-ﬁnding rates
and unemployment rates are non-positively correlated, Cov(ut,st) ≤ 0, with at least one of the
inequalities holding strictly.13
If above conditions are satisﬁed, the rise in average unemployment is the more pronounced, the
more job-ﬁnding rates ﬂuctuate with the cycle. The economics is simple. Let us focus on the
case that E{st} = s. A negative correlation of job-ﬁnding rates and unemployment, which is
at the heart of models of equilibrium unemployment, means that unemployed workers are more
11 As remarked by Krusell and Smith (1999), among others, having wages co-move with the cycle would lead
to slightly higher average earnings, since workers tend to be employed precisely when wages are high. Mean
eﬀects on employment associated with ﬂuctuations would easily outweigh the gains, however. We do not report
results here for brevity, but they are available upon request.
12 Here as in the following we will refer to the non-stochastic steady state, i.e., the steady state in the absence
of business cycle ﬂuctuations, as the “steady state.”
13 Proof: using the stationarity of st and ut, equation (1) implies
ϑE {1 − ut} = E {stut} = COV (st,ut) + E {st}E {ut}.
Deducting the steady-state version of (1) on both sides of the above, we have that
−ϑ[E {ut} − u] = COV (st,ut) + E {st}E {ut} − su,
or equivalently
−ϑ[E {ut} − u] = COV (st,ut) + [E {st} − s]E {ut} + s[E {ut} − u],
so
E{ut} − u = −
1
ϑ + s
(COV (st,ut) + [E {st} − s]E {ut}),
from which the proposition follows.
7likely to ﬁnd a job in a boom, when there are fewer unemployed workers to start with, than in
a recession, when many workers are unemployed. As a result, average unemployment rises.14
Technology evolves according to
At − A = ρA(At−1 − A) + ǫA
t , (2)
where ρ ∈ [0,1) and ǫA
t
iid ∼ N(0,σ2
A). Removing business cycles in this paper means reducing σ2
A
to zero.15 Variables without a time index refer to values in steady state. In one of the speciﬁca-
tions, we also allow for skill depreciation when unemployed, but abstract from introducing the
notation here for brevity.
Assumptions about job-ﬁnding and unemployment
Unemployment will be endogenized in the model shown in Section 3. For now, we examine two
diﬀerent setups regarding the behavior of unemployment over the business cycle. In the ﬁrst
setup,
ut = u − ξu(At−1 − 1), ξu ≥ 0, (3)
so E {ut} = u. If ξu > 0, the job-ﬁnding rate, denoted st, adjusts endogenously to ensure that
(1) holds. In the alternative setup, the separation rate follows a speciﬁed law of motion and
unemployment responds endogenously according to (1).16
st = s + ξs(At − 1), ξs ≥ 0. (4)
Note that the mean job-ﬁnding rate is as high as in the steady state, but that mean unemploy-
ment can be aﬀected by the business cycle. Indeed, for the latter case up to second order the
mean unemployment rate will be given by





1 − (1 − ϑ − s)ρ
ρ
1 − ρ2 σ2
A. (5)
14 While labor market models will generate the empirical fact that Cov(ut,st) < 0, the condition E{st} ≤ 0
holds less generally. E{st} = 0 if mean wages are unaﬀected by the business cycle and workers are risk-neutral,
as is the case in special versions of the basic Mortensen-Pissarides model; see Appendix B.1.
15 We formulate technology as an AR(1) in levels rather than in logs, as is standard. This way, by eliminating
the business cycle we do not change the mean of technology. Given the calibration of ρ and σA, technology
becoming negative is almost a zero probability event. Results, quantitatively, are barely aﬀected by this choice.
16 Hall (2005) regards variations in the separation rate of little importance for explaining unemployment ﬂuc-
tuations, a view that has been rejected recently by Fujita and Ramey (2007). We have conducted sensitivity
analysis with counter-cyclical separation rates. If only separation rates ﬂuctuate, they decrease average un-
employment, due to the concavity of unemployment and separation rates in (1). When both separation and
job-ﬁnding rates vary, however, the costs of cycles are slightly ampliﬁed relative to the case that we assess.
The reason is that workers then would be laid oﬀ precisely when it is diﬃcult to ﬁnd a new job.
8The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side shows that the change in mean unemployment rates depends
on the level of unemployment. The second term illustrates that the mean eﬀect is the stronger
the more job-ﬁnding rates co-move with the cycle, i.e., the larger ξs. The last term illustrates
that the mean eﬀects will be the stronger the more persistent and the more volatile technology
is.17
More generally, however, the sign of E {st}−s would be ambiguous; in particular, if the discount
kernel is endogenous, workers are risk-averse, and/or the wage-bargaining process results in a
non-linear dependence of wages on productivity. We therefore resort to a general equilibrium
model with risk-averse workers in Section 3 and use numerical methods to analyze the welfare
costs. Before doing so, however, we illustrate the welfare costs with the above simple examples.
2.1 Higher mean unemployment
The welfare costs of business cycles are the percentage share of steady-state consumption that
consumers would be willing to forgo if business cycle ﬂuctuations would be eliminated; see
Appendix A for details.
Most of the literature assumes that business cycles do not aﬀect mean unemployment risk.18 In
line with this, a black solid line in Figure 1 reports the welfare costs of business cycles against
the replacement rate when unemployment ﬂuctuates according to (3).19 Even though workers
are liquidity-constrained, regardless of the level of beneﬁts there are no welfare costs of business
cycles. Mere unemployment ﬂuctuations shift states of unemployment over time with no eﬀect
on mean unemployment (by assumption) and the expected discounted stream of utility (as a
result); see Atkeson and Phelan (1994) and Krusell and Smith (1999).20 Even if workers had
higher unemployment risk to start with, as assumed by Mukoyama and S ¸ahin (2006), business
cycles would not be costly.
In contrast, when the job-ﬁnding rate ﬂuctuates according to (4) (see the black squares), mean
17 The proof is contained in Proposition 2, see Appendix B.2.
18 See, e.g., Atkeson and Phelan (1994), Krusell and Smith (1999) and Krebs (2007). Some counterexamples are
listed in Barlevy (2005).
19 One period in the model is one month. The parameters we choose are in line with the more detailed calibration
described in Section 4: β = .997, ρA = .983, σA = .00257. We normalize A = 1. The steady-state separation
rate is set to ϑ = .024% per month. The steady-state unemployment rate is u = .057, and the steady-state
job-ﬁnding rate is s = .4 per month. When positive, we set ξs = 4.54 and ξu = .4365. These values replicate
the standard deviation of either the job-ﬁnding rate or the unemployment rate, respectively.
20 This is not to say that unemployment insurance would not aﬀect welfare, but only that business cycles do not
aﬀect their role.
9Figure 1: Welfare costs of business cycles – unemployment ﬂuctuations







































replacement rate replacement rate
ut follows (3), ξu = .4365.
st follows (4), ξs = 4.54, E {ut} = .0582 > u.
Notes: The panels show the welfare costs of business cycles (in percent of steady-state consumption)
for alternative replacement rates of unemployment insurance (x-axis). From left to right: linear
utility (risk-neutrality, σ = 0) and log-utility (σ = 1). A black solid line shows the case in which
unemployment ﬂuctuates over the cycle, following (3). Black squares show the case in which the
job-ﬁnding rate follows (4). Average unemployment is 2.18% above steady state (corresponding to
0.12 percentage point).
unemployment exceeds the steady-state level by 0.12 percentage point, as a direct result of the
non-linearity underlying the employment ﬂow equation (1). The costs of business cycles exceed
Lucas’ (1987) estimates by an order of magnitude (see the black squares). In this context,
higher unemployment beneﬁts reduce the welfare costs of business cycles as they insure against
the rise in average unemployment risk. When the replacement rate is 100%, average income
when employed is the same as when unemployed and welfare costs of business cycles are nil
again.21
2.2 Higher mean unemployment and lower average skills
In addition to the framework described above, now we further assume that the workers’ skills
depend on their employment. For the sake of brevity, the details are postponed to Section 3. In
brief, we assume that workers can have good skills (productivity 1.3) or bad skills (productivity
0.7). When employed, workers with bad skills on average need 48 months to acquire good skills.
They never lose these skills if they remain employed. Unemployed workers with good skills
lose these with a 10% probability in each month of unemployment. Unemployed workers cannot
21 We assume that replacement income is ﬁnanced exogenously or composed of home production.
10move from bad to good skills. This implies that unemployment spells are associated with longer-
term earnings losses, and that on average losses are larger in recessions when the duration of
unemployment tends to be longer. When unemployment rates in the two skill groups vary with
Figure 2: Costs of cycles – unemployment ﬂuctuations and skill transition

























replacement rate replacement rate
ut in each skill group follows (3), ξu = .4365.
st in each skill group follows (4), ξs = 4.54.
Notes: As in Figure 1, but with skill transitions. The panels show the welfare costs of
business cycles (in percent of steady-state consumption) for alternative replacement rates
of unemployment insurance (x-axis). Left: linear utility (risk-neutrality), right: log-utility
(σ = 1). The black solid line shows the case in which unemployment in each of the skill
groups ﬂuctuates over the cycle, following (3). Black squares mark the case in which the
job-ﬁnding rate in each skill group follows (4). Mean unemployment rises by 1.8% above the
non-stochastic steady state (so the mean unemployment rate rises by 0.1 percentage point).
The share of workers with good skills on average falls by .38% (0.29 percentage point).
the business cycle, but mean unemployment in each of the skill groups is not aﬀected, there are
no welfare costs of business cycles; see the black solid line in Figure 2. This is the case even
though recessions bring about higher longer-run earnings losses than booms, as in Krebs (2007)
and even though – due to the possible skill losses – the average worker that suﬀered displacement
will have a lower entry wage, as in Beaudry and Pages (2001).22 Eliminating the business cycle
in this scenario would eliminate the correlation of unemployment across individuals but it would
not aﬀect the average risk of being caught in each of the four employment-skill states; see
Atkeson and Phelan (1994).23
22 In Krebs (2007) earnings losses upon displacement are larger in recessions than in booms. However, the
displacement cost shock has mean zero. He increases the standard deviation of idiosyncratic risk in a recession.
In our example, in contrast, the mean costs ﬂuctuate. In Beaudry and Pages (2001), wages while employed are
downward-rigid but upward-mobile. Wages ratchet up in booms to prevent workers from defecting to other
employers. Costs of business cycles arise independent of any eﬀects on skills, because entry-level wages are
low in recessions, and lower than wages paid to workers in ongoing contracts, thereby increasing the earnings
risk. In this paper, we do not allow for such contractual eﬀects.
11To the contrary, when job-ﬁnding rates in the two skill groups are on average as large as in steady
state, but vary with the cycle, mean employment again is negatively aﬀected (see the black
squares). As can be seen, skill transitions further amplify the welfare eﬀects shown previously
in Figure 1. A higher level of average unemployment implies longer average unemployment
durations. These in turn mean that more workers will lose their skills during an unemployment
spell.24 In the example shown, the share of lower-skilled workers in the population rises by
about .25 percentage points above the non-stochastic steady state. Also the welfare costs do
not fall to zero as beneﬁts rise. Beneﬁts can insure workers against the mean increase in overall
unemployment, but not against the diﬀerential impact on the two skill groups.
3 The full model
Evidently, the precise interplay of job-ﬁnding, unemployment and aggregate cyclical risk is
important for the costs of business cycles. This section extends the previous analysis to a real
business cycle model with Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) search and matching frictions that
generates this link endogenously. Workers fall into two categories, the liquidity-constrained
workers analyzed above, and workers who can save into stocks and physical capital. For the
latter we entertain a family structure as in den Haan, Ramey, and Watson (2000), which pools
their assets and incomes. The two classes of workers are indexed by superscripts liq and fam,
respectively. Workers do not transit between the groups.
3.1 Individual-speciﬁc productivity
There are two components to an individual’s productivity: an aggregate component, At, and
an idiosyncratic component. Workers can either have good or bad idiosyncratic productivity
23 The average welfare costs mask heterogeneity across skill groups. Business cycles increase the probability that
workers with good skills lose their skills (in a longer recession), but also raise the chances that workers with
bad skills acquire good skills (in a prolonged boom). As a result, workers who already have good skills dislike
business cycle ﬂuctuations, while workers with bad skills like them (their skills cannot become worse than
bad).
24 Throughout this paper separation is exogenous. Nevertheless, in this example, inﬂow rates into lower-skilled
unemployment rise in recessions since some unemployed workers with previously good skills lose them. As a
result, when outﬂow rates are particularly low in recessions and are kept constant on average, once there are
cyclical ﬂuctuations, the incidence of being low-skilled rises by a disproportionate amount.





Ag,t := ǫgAt, if worker i has good skills, g,
Ab,t := ǫbAt, if worker i has bad skills, b,
where ǫg = 1 + ω and ǫb = 1 − ω, ω ≥ 0. Individual productivity is determined at the end of
each period. The aggregate component of productivity evolves according to (2). We denote the
conditional probability that a worker will move from good to bad productivity when employed by













Through the diﬀerent transition probabilities, the model can capture diﬀerent assumptions about
the appreciation or depreciation of skills across employment states; see Section 5.1.
3.2 Preferences and consumers’ constraints

























1+ϕ , σ = 1,ϕ > 0.
3.2.1 Families of asset-holding workers
There is a measure ν ∈ [0,1] of identical families in the economy. Each family consists of a unit
measure of members. In period t, a measure efam
g,t of these are employed and have good skills
and efam
b,t are employed with bad skills. A measure ufam
g,t of family members have good skills but
are unemployed. The remainder, ufam
b,t = 1 − efam
g,t − efam
b,t − ufam
g,t , are unemployed and have bad
25 Hall (2007) ﬁnds that the variation in hours per employee accounts for 31.5% of the total cyclical ﬂuctuation
in labor input while the extensive margin accounts for 56.5%. A smaller remainder (11.6%), from which we
abstract here, is explained by cyclical variation in the participation rate.
13skills. The family collects and distributes all income, maximizing the sum of expected utilities






































































t is per capita consumption by family members, and it
ν marks real investment per family
member. tt are lump-sum taxes per capita payable by the family. The terms wfam
·,t hfam
·,t are the
real earnings of employed household members of the respective idiosyncratic productivity. Ifam
·
are real unemployment beneﬁts. kt is the amount of physical capital in the economy at the
beginning of the period.27 The real rental rate of capital is rt. Ψt denotes income arising from
the ﬁrms’ proﬁts, described below in equation (11). Capital evolves according to
kt+1 = kt(1 − δ) + it, (7)
where δ ≥ 0 is the monthly rate of depreciation.
The family’s ﬁrst-order conditions
The family maximizes its objective by choosing investment, it, and consumption, cfam
t , subject
to (6) and (7). The investment ﬁrst-order condition is
1 = Et {βt,t+1 [(1 − δ) + rt+1]},










 −σ is the family’s
marginal utility of consumption. The optimal consumption plan satisﬁes transversality condition
lim
j→∞
Et {βt,t+jkt+j} = 0, ∀t.
26 Due to additive separability of consumption and leisure the family optimally allocates the same consumption
to all members. The notation also uses that we will later on focus on a symmetric equilibrium in which all
employed family members of a respective type work exactly the same hours and earn the same wage.
27 So
kt
ν is the capital holding per member of the family.
143.2.2 Liquidity-constrained consumers
The remaining measure 1 − ν of consumers are liquidity-constrained. In period t, a share e
liq
g,t
of these are employed and have good skills while e
liq
b,t are employed with bad skills. A share
u
liq









g,t, are unemployed and have bad skills. Liquidity-constrained consumers
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b if unemployed and of bad productivity.
I
liq
· are real beneﬁts paid to unemployed liquidity-constrained workers.
3.3 Firms
There are two sectors of production. One sector produces a homogeneous intermediate labor
good. A ﬁnal good sector uses the labor good and physical capital to produce a homogeneous
consumption/investment good, yt.
3.3.1 Final goods
The representative ﬁrm in the ﬁnal good sector produces output according to
yt = kα
t l1−α
t , α ∈ (0,1).
The ﬁnal good ﬁrm can rent capital and the labor good in competitive markets at rates rt and










28 We assume the absence of any opportunity to store wealth for this liquidity-constrained part of the population.
This is a strong assumption. One might consider that these consumers could still save into cash or durable
consumption goods. The ﬁrst option, however, does not seem to be supported by micro data either; besides
Gruber (2001) see Wolﬀ (1998); and durable goods tend to be illiquid and thus cannot easily be used to smooth
non-durable consumption over the business cycle.
153.3.2 Labor good ﬁrms
The one-worker labor ﬁrms produce a homogeneous labor good. Firm-worker matches inherit
their productivity from the worker. Match i can produce amount li,t of the labor good according
to
li,t = Atǫihi,t,
where ǫi ∈ {ǫg,ǫb} depending on the type of the worker. In period t there is a mass νefam
g,t of labor
ﬁrms with workers who have good skills and live in a family, and a mass νefam
b,t of workers who





of workers of the two types who are liquidity-constrained. In equilibrium, labor good demand
must match the labor good sector’s supply. We focus on a symmetric equilibrium in which each



































The timing of the labor market is as follows. Workers who are already matched with ﬁrms
bargain about wages and hours. Production takes place. Thereafter idiosyncratic transitions of
productivity materialize and ﬁrms post vacancies. New matches are determined and separations
occur. We work backwards and ﬁrst describe separation and the bargaining. We then describe
the matching process and vacancy posting decisions. In the model, there are four separate labor
markets, one for each type of worker (the combinations of (fam,liq ) × (g,b)). For the sake of
exposition, we describe all of the labor market activity for just one type of worker, a worker who
has good skills and lives in the family. Unless noted otherwise, equations for the other types are
entirely symmetric; i.e., they can be obtained by swapping g’s with b’s, when looking at a bad
skill type, and by exchanging fam with liq, when looking at a worker who is liquidity-constrained.
3.4.1 Labor ﬁrm value and exogenous separations






Toward the end of the period, after production has taken place and after the skill level of
the match has been realized, each ﬁrm draws an exogenous separation shock, such that with
16probability ϑfam the match is severed. If it survives, the match continues into the next period.
Let Jfam








Firms and workers bargain about their share of the overall match surplus. In this paper, we
adopt a simpliﬁed form of a bargaining mechanism analyzed by Hall and Milgrom (2008), who
assume that the outside option in the bargaining process is to delay the bargaining by one
period.29 We assume that workers would face a constant stream of utility/income in the periods
in which the bargain is delayed, labeled ‘strike’. In equilibrium, under complete information
rational ﬁrms and workers would never delay the bargaining but instead they would agree on a
wage immediately. A strike thus would never actually occur.
The surplus from working rather than delaying the bargaining is as follows.30 When working,
the worker earns wages but loses the strike payment. At the same time he suﬀers disutility of
work. With the latter term being converted from utils to real values by dividing through the
















For the family, λfam
g,t = λfam
b,t , and these in turn equal λfam
t due to perfect risk-sharing, while the
two terms will generally not coincide for liquidity-constrained agents.31 Each period, wages and
hours worked are determined by means of bargaining over the match surplus, where η ∈ (0,1)













29 They also allow for a small exogenous probability that the bargain breaks down, from which we abstract here
for tractability. See Section 3.8 for further discussion.
30 For workers belonging to the family, we follow den Haan, Ramey, and Watson (2000) in assuming that the
family takes their labor supply decision. For these, the surplus reported is the gain of the family from having


















17The resulting ﬁrst-order condition for hours worked equates the marginal rate of substitution of









The ﬁrst-order condition for wages yields the result that earnings are a convex combination of
the ﬁrm’s revenue and the terms determining the bargaining position (saved disutility of work

















This wage equation resembles the standard wage equation with Nash bargaining, except for two
diﬀerences. With Nash bargaining, the outside option of the worker is unemployment; therefore,
typically unemployment beneﬁts and market tightness enter the wage equation. Instead, in our
wage equation, the term strikefam
g appears, which captures an exogenous shift in the bargaining
position of the worker not related to consumption ﬂows in equilibrium.32
3.4.3 Matching ﬁrms with workers










, χ > 0,ξ ∈ (0,1).
Here mfam
g,t is the number of new matches. ˜ ufam
g,t = ufam
g,t pu(g,g) + ufam
b,t pu(b,g) is the share of
unemployed workers in the family with good skills after new skills have been drawn. vfam
g,t is the






a ﬁrm with a
vacant good position ﬁnds a good worker in period t. Unemployed workers always search for a






an unemployed worker of the respective type will ﬁnd a job.
32 As before, all of the above equations hold analogously for workers with bad skills (replacing g indexes by b
indexes). They also hold for liquidity-constrained workers (replacing
fam labels by
liq), apart from the following.
































































In order to stand a chance of ﬁnding a worker of a speciﬁc type, ﬁrms need to post a vacancy.
As a result of free entry into the vacancy posting market, in equilibrium the cost of posting a
vacancy for the respective type of worker, κfam










g,t is the probability of ﬁnding a worker once a vacancy has been posted.
3.4.5 Labor market ﬂows
Employment of the good and bad skill types evolves according to
efam















Note that current employment is equally non-linear in past unemployment and job-ﬁnding rates














and analogously for the liquidity-constrained workers.
3.4.6 Total proﬁts

















































The ﬁrst row gives the period proﬁts of all labor ﬁrms. The second row reports that the total
costs for posting vacancies also need to be borne by the family.
33 We continue to display the vacancy posting decisions only for the good type of workers who live in the family.
The condition is analogous for the other types of workers.
193.5 Government
Government spending, gt, is exogenous and follows the AR(1) process
gt = g + ρ(gt−1 − g) + ǫ
g
t, ρg ∈ [0,1).




g) is a Gaussian shock. The





















The government generates revenue from lump-sum taxes levied on the families (left), which it
uses for unemployment beneﬁts (the terms involving I·
·) and government spending. In order to
eliminate any dependence of the evolution of the economy on the precise nature of the tax rule
only the (Ricardian) families/asset-holding households pay taxes. Lump-sum taxes, tt, adjust
to ensure government solvency in all states of the world.
3.6 Market clearing and equilibrium
In equilibrium, the ﬁnal goods market and the labor and capital markets clear. The aggregate
retail good is used for consumption by the two types of consumers, investment and government
spending. Also vacancy posting activity requires resources, so output is used according to






















where aggregate consumption demand, ct, is given by
ct := νcfam






















The welfare of the family is given by
Wfam
t = u(cfam











































20Swapping gs and bs yields the welfare of a liquidity-constrained worker with bad skills who is































Welfare costs of business cycles are measured as discussed in Appendix A.
3.8 The bargaining position
For the calibration of the bargaining position of the worker, we follow Hagedorn and Manovskii
(2008) with one important modiﬁcation. For matching unemployment ﬂuctuations, their calibra-





 . As a result, the worker would be almost indiﬀerent
between being employed and being unemployed almost by construction, with consequences for
the welfare costs of business cycles. In our setup, instead, the bargaining position is determined
by the value of parameter strike·
·, which is independent of the replacement income. While we can
nest the calibration of Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) (we show results for diﬀerent replacement
rates in Section 5), we can also accommodate any other size of the replacement rate without
aﬀecting the positive implications of our model and, in particular, its cyclical properties.34
4 Calibration of the baseline
The calibration is based on US data from 1984Q1 to 2007Q4. We use the Hodrick-Prescott
ﬁlter with a conventional ﬁlter weight of 1,600 to extract the business cycle component from
the quarterly data in logs. All variables are seasonally adjusted. Nominal variables are deﬂated
by the GDP deﬂator. Output, consumption, investment and government spending are from the
national accounts. Our measure for investment includes durable consumption. The measure for
consumption is composed of consumption of non-durable goods and services. Total hours worked
are average weekly hours in total private industries multiplied by employment (labor force minus
34 Since business cycles in our model imply higher mean unemployment, the costs of ﬁnancing beneﬁts also
increase. There are therefore some minor changes in the unemployment taxes levied on the family. To avoid
this interaction, we also experimented with accounting for the replacement income as home production. Results
were hardly aﬀected. Parameter strike could be the true opportunity of a strike or could reﬂect the fact that
the worker may be able to supplement a certain level of beneﬁts by a positive amount of home production.
Alternatively, there may also be insurance provided by the family for the liquidity-constrained worker, say,
through spousal labor supply. Needless to say, neither of this is modeled here.
21the number of unemployed). Our measure for total wages is compensation of employees from the
national accounts. We use the civilian unemployment rate among those 16 years old and older.
Vacancies are measured by the Conference Board’s index of Help-Wanted Advertising. The job-
ﬁnding rate in our model is the hazard rate of transition from unemployment to employment
in any given month. This time series is not readily available. We follow Shimer (2007), who
proposes a measurement. These calculations also require the series of civilians unemployed for
less than 5 weeks.
Table 1: Baseline calibration of the model
Types and Preferences Production
1 − ν .16 Gruber (2001). A .63 Normalize y to unity.
β .997 Annual real rate of 4 percent. α .33 Conventional conﬁguration.
ϕ 2.0 Domeij and Flod´ en (2006). δ .0087 Mean inv./GDP = 24%.
σ 1.0 Log utility ω 0 No skill diﬀerence.
κh 36.37 Hours per worker, hfam = 1/3.
Labor market - job ﬁnding Labor market - separation
ξ .5 Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001). ϑ .024 Job-ﬁnding rate of 40%.
κfam .086 Unemployment rate, ufam = 5.7%.
κliq .161 Unemployment rate, uliq = 5.7%.
χ .34 qfam = .33, den Haan et al. (2000). Labor market - bargaining
Aggregate Shocks η .5 Equal surplus sharing rule.
ρA .951/3 autocorrelation tech shock strikefam .46 std(  ut), std(  ufam
t )=std(  u
liq
t ).
σA .0026 targets std(yt) strikeliq .45 std(  ut), std(  ufam
t )=std(  u
liq
t ).
ρg .922 as in data Government
σg 9.8e-4 as in data g .19 Mean gov. spending/GDP.
Notes: This table presents the parameterization for the baseline version of the model and the corresponding
targets. This version does not have any skill heterogeneity. This means, among other things, that the skill
transition probabilities, such as p
e(g,b), are irrelevant.
We seek to calibrate parameters for the workers in the family as much in line with those for
the liquidity-constrained workers as possible. Table 1 summarizes our parameter choices and
presents the targets that we match. Table 2 reports the resulting steady state. Table 3 compares
second moments in the model to second moments in the data. Turning ﬁrst to the parameters,
the size of the liquidity-constrained group of workers is set to 1−ν = 0.16. This follows Gruber
(2001) who estimates that at least 16% of the US population cannot cover the consumption costs
of an average unemployment spell.35 Workers in the family and liquidity-constrained workers
35 This number therefore represents a lower bound for the share of liquidity-constrained workers since it uses
total wealth as the relevant pool of assets. When Gruber (2001) takes only liquid assets into account the share
rises.
22have the same preferences. The time discount factor targets a real rate of 4%, so β = 1.04(−1/12).
The Frisch elasticity of labor supply is set to .5 as estimated by Domeij and Flod´ en (2006),
which implies ϕ = 2. Workers have log utility for consumption, σ = 1.36 In setting the scaling
parameter for disutility of work, we target hours per worker in the family, hfam = 1/3, which
implies κh = 36.37.37
Table 2: Implied steady state
Per capita consumption(1) Hours worked when employed and wages
cfam .55 family. fam liq
c
liq
e .65 constrained, employed. hfam, hliq .33 .30 hours per worker.
c
liq
u .26 constrained, unemployed. wfam, wliq 2.15 2.13 hourly wage.
Income side of GDP Labor market - stocks and ﬂows
whn/y .66 labor income to GDP. ufam, uliq .057 .057 unemployment rate.
rkk/y .33 capital share. vfam, vliq .075 .075 vacancies.
Ψ/y .001 proﬁt share. sfam, sliq .40 .40 probability of ﬁnding a job.
Use of output Labor market - proﬁts of labor ﬁrms
i/y .24 investment output ratio. Ψfam
lfam , Ψliq
lliq .037 .055 proﬁt to output ratios.
c/y .56 (non-dur. +services)/output.
g/y .19 government cons. /output.
κv/y .0069 vacancy costs to output.
Notes: Selected features of the steady state when the model is parameterized as described in Table 1. All
values refer to a monthly frequency.
(1) The steady-state values for consumption depend on the values of the replacement rate (through income
when unemployed for the constrained workers and through taxes for the family). The values reported here
pertain to a 40% replacement rate (
I
wh = .40).
In the baseline there are no skill diﬀerences within groups, ω = 0. The steady-state level of
technology, A, is set so as to normalize monthly steady-state output to unity. The depreciation
rate of capital, δ, targets a steady-state investment to GDP ratio of 24%. The value of the
separation rate in the economy is 2.4% per month, so as to ensure that the steady-state job-
ﬁnding rate per month is 40%, the mean value in the data. We set the weight on unemployment
in matching to ξ = .5 for all types of workers, following the evidence for the aggregate matching
function in Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001). The vacancy posting costs for each type are
36 Log-utility has the advantage that any non-cyclical component of idiosyncratic risk neglected in the current
analysis would not aﬀect the estimate of the cost of business cycles.
37 Once the model is approximated to a second (or higher) order of accuracy, mean values and steady state
values for endogenous variables cease to coincide. In principle one could either target steady-state values or
mean values. We follow the common practice in the literature and target steady-state values; i.e., we associate
those with the mean values observed in the data. This has the advantage of improving comparability with the
literature and is a much simpler program. Qualitatively, none of our results depend on this procedure.
23set so as to ensure that they have the same rate of steady-state unemployment, u = 5.7%.
The eﬃciency of matching, χ, is set such that ﬁrms with a vacancy ﬁnd a worker with a 33%
probability within a month’s time, the value used in den Haan, Ramey, and Watson (2000)
translated to a monthly frequency.
The bargaining power of workers is set to η = .5. Parameters strike·
·, which determine the
bargaining position of the respective type of worker, are set such that the model replicates the
aggregate unemployment ﬂuctuations in the data while restricting the unemployment ﬂuctua-
tions in the two subgroups to be of equal size.
Finally, the steady-state level of government spending is 19% of GDP, with its autocorrelation
and standard deviation being chosen such that the model matches these moments in the HP-
ﬁltered data. The technology shock has an autocorrelation of ρA = .951/3, and its standard
deviation is chosen to match the standard deviation of HP-ﬁltered log quarterly output from
simulations of the model to that in the data. Table 2 reports the resulting steady state, when
assuming, in addition to the above parameters, that the replacement rate is 40%, which is about
the average level for the US, see Engen and Gruber (2001).
Table 3 shows the standard deviations, auto- and cross-correlations of the economy-wide HP-
ﬁltered quarterly aggregates, and compares those moments to the data.38 The model matches
the serial correlations quite well. As is the case in the standard RBC model, however, the model
predicts too much co-movement of some variables with the cycle, in particular of wages and
earnings. It is somewhat more worrisome that the model accounts for only about two thirds of
the volatility of consumption that we observe in the data and roughly half of the volatility of
hours worked and wages.39 Given that we attribute all unemployment ﬂuctuations to the hiring
margin, the job-ﬁnding probability is somewhat too volatile.
Table 4 illustrates what the above calibration implies for ﬂuctuations of consumption in the
respective groups. What was to be expected is that consumption of the average liquidity-
constrained worker, c
liq
t , is somewhat more volatile than consumption in the family, and much
more correlated with the business cycle. This is so since employment ﬂuctuates considerably
over the cycle, which induces larger swings in average per capita consumption of constrained
workers than of workers who can save.
38 In order to solve the model, we use second-order perturbation methods as in Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2004).
39 In a previous version of this paper we estimated a New Keynesian version of the baseline model on US data,
allowing for four additional shock processes, which are standard in the New Keynesian literature. We show
that such a model indeed gives a very accurate description of the US business cycle.
24Table 3: Second moments in the model compared to the quarterly data
Std. deviation Corr. with   yt AR(1) (qoq)
Variable (quart.) data model data model data model
GDP and components
  yt .89 .89 1.00 1.00 .87 .83
  ct .61 .43 .72 .92 .84 .83
  it 3.19 2.50 .86 .97 .89 .84
  gt 1.06 1.06 -.11 .05 .77 .77
Labor market: wages and employment
  ht +   et .97 .51 .76 .96 .82 .85
  wt +   ht +   et 1.36 .75 .74 1.00 .91 .84
  wt .96 .27 .27 .95 .75 .74
  ut 8.25 8.25 -.79 -.92 .93 .85
Labor market: Job ﬁnding and separation
  vt 10.31 11.25 .80 .88 .90 .61
  st 6.15 8.92 .74 .97 .80 .78
Notes: The table compares second moments of variables as implied by the model to their
counterparts in the data. The ﬁrst two columns report unconditional standard deviations,
the next two columns report the contemporaneous correlation with output and the ﬁnal two
columns report quarter-on-quarter autocorrelation coeﬃcients. For the data moments, all
values are computed from 1984:q1 to 2007:q4. All data are in logs, HP(1,600) ﬁltered and
multiplied by 100 in order to express them in percent deviation from steady state/trend. All
data and model counterparts are in quarterly terms. From top to bottom: output per capita,
consumption per capita, investment per capita, government spending, total hours worked, total
wages, hourly wage rate, unemployment rate, vacancies, job-ﬁnding rate.
5 Results: the welfare costs of business cycles
For the baseline calibration discussed in the previous section, Figure 3 plots the welfare costs
of business cycles for both groups of workers (asset-holding family members, and the average
liquidity-constrained worker) as a function of the replacement rate.40 As discussed in Appendix
A, these costs are computed neglecting the transition path. Results are similar, however, when
taking the transition into account. These numbers are reported at the end of this section. Three
observations are apparent:
First, the costs of business cycles for liquidity-constrained workers fall with the replacement rate
(see squares). As Section 2 highlighted, higher beneﬁts insure the liquidity-constrained worker
against a higher mean risk of unemployment. Since the cost of unemployment insurance is
exclusively borne by the family, their welfare costs (thick solid line) rise with the unemployment
40 The level of the replacement rate for the household does not play any role in the welfare costs of business cycles
because on the one hand, we keep the bargaining position, strike, constant throughout our counterfactuals,
and on the other hand, beneﬁts are ﬁnanced by lump-sum taxes levied on the family.
25Table 4: Second moments in the model – break down by type
Std. Corr(x,y) AR(1) Std. Corr(x,y) AR(1)
Consumption Hours, wages and rental rates
  cfam
t .42 .89 .82   hfam
t .10 .17 .76
  c
liq
t .52 .98 .83   h
liq
t .07 .95 .72
  c
liq
e,t .29 .95 .72   wfam
t .28 .95 .75
Unemployment, job-ﬁnding   w
liq
t .22 .95 .72
  ufam
t 8.29 -.93 .85   rk
t .89 .96 .82
  u
liq
t 8.29 -.85 .86
  sfam
t 9.06 .96 .78
  s
liq
t 8.22 .98 .79
Notes: This table extends Table 3 by showing a breakdown of second moments by
type of worker for selected variables, as implied by the model. All entries are in
logs, HP(1,600) ﬁltered and multiplied by 100 in order to express them in percent
deviation from steady state. All data are in quarterly terms. Left: consumption
of a family member, consumption of an average liquidity-constrained worker, of an
employed liquidity-constrained worker (consumption of the unemployed counterpart
does not ﬂuctuate with the cycle); unemployment and the job-ﬁnding probability.
Right: hours per worker, hourly wages, and the rental rate of capital. From left to
right in each block: std deviation, correlation with output, quarterly autocorrelation.





















welfare costs for the family.
welfare costs for avg. liq.-constrained.
Notes: Welfare costs of business cycles (in percent of
steady-state consumption) for alternative replacement
rates. The thick solid line shows the welfare costs for
the family. Squares mark ex ante welfare costs for the
liquidity-constrained workers.
beneﬁts that the liquidity-constrained agents receive.41 Table 5 shows the means of endogenous
41 Results are very similar when attributing the replacement income to home production. The only visible
diﬀerence is that there is no association between welfare costs for the family and the replacement rate. These
26Table 5: Mean eﬀects in the baseline (as percent change from steady state)
Output and consumption Unemployment Hours per worker
y -.15 ufam 3.97 hfam
g .14
cfam -.24 uliq 11.18 hfam
b -.0018
cliq -.36 Unemployment rates Wages and rental rates
c
liq
e .005 uratefam 3.97 wfam -.03
Capital, and employment urateliq 11.18 wliq .0036
kt -.11 Job-ﬁnding rate w -.03
efam -.23 sfam 4.18 x .021
eliq -.67 sliq .19 rk -.012
Notes: The table shows percentage deviations of the mean of selected variables from the non-
stochastic steady state. The values refer to a 40% replacement rate (corresponding to the left-most
panel in Figure 3). Left column top to bottom: output, consumption of a family member, average
consumption of a liquidity-constrained consumer, consumption of an employed liquidity-constrained
consumer; capital and employment. Center column: unemployment; unemployment rate (coincides
with percentage deviation in unemployment since the measure of workers in each family and liquidity-
constrained group is normalized to unity); job-ﬁnding rates. Right column: hours per worker; wage
per hour, w is the aggregate wage rate, price of labor, rental rate of capital.
variables for a 40% replacement rate as percent deviations from the steady state. Most notably,
mean unemployment rates for both the family and the liquidity-constrained workers are higher
than in the steady state. Intuitively, the business cycle drives the job-ﬁnding probability in a
pro-cyclical manner. As Section 2 illustrated, for given mean job-ﬁnding rates, this can induce an
increase in average unemployment rates, consistent with Table 5.42 For the liquidity-constrained
workers unemployment rises by 11%, or by about 1.3 percentage points (to an unemployment
rate of 7%). For the family the increase is smaller but still notable (4%, or 0.14 percentage
point). Appendix B.1 provides further intuition for this eﬀect in our model and also for the
diﬀerential eﬀect in the two groups of workers. The ensuing decline in employment reduces the
return to capital and so has a negative eﬀect on the capital stock. This eﬀect is not present in
Krusell and Smith (1999), who ﬁnd that precautionary savings increase the level of capital. In
our economy the negative eﬀect on employment dominates the precautionary savings eﬀect. In
the presence of business cycles the average capital stock therefore is lower in our economy than
in the steady state while the precautionary savings eﬀect alone would have meant more savings
(by the family) and thus more capital and higher wages (which would have been beneﬁcial for
wage earners).43 Table 5 also shows in detail the mean eﬀects in hours worked and wages.
results are available upon request.
42 In the above example, mean job-ﬁnding rates are also higher than in the steady state, thereby somewhat
weakening this eﬀect.
43 If the cyclical volatility in unemployment rates is reduced by enough by setting a lower strike value, or the risk-
27The family increases its labor supply along the intensive margin, while the liquidity-constrained
worker hardly adjusts his hours worked. The diﬀerences can be explained by diﬀerences in
the wealth eﬀect associated with the drop in mean capital. In general, with log utility, and
in the absence of non-labor income, the substitution and the income eﬀect cancel out. The
liquidity-constrained worker, having no capital-income by deﬁnition, does not face a decline in
non-labor market income. Hence his labor supply along the intensive margin remains constant.
The family, however, having lower capital income, is poorer. As a result, they counteract the
drop in consumption by working more.44
Second, for replacement rates of around 40% percent, which are in line with the average replace-
ment rate in the US (see Engen and Gruber (2001)) the costs of business cycles are very similar
for the family and the liquidity-constrained workers, 0.37% and 0.35%, respectively. On the one
hand, the shifts in mean unemployment have a direct eﬀect also on employment in the family.
In addition, lower economy-wide employment means lower returns to capital for the family, plus
the family also suﬀers from ﬂuctuations in rental income over the cycle.
Third, in the baseline the costs of business cycles for the liquidity-constrained workers rise
notably for lower replacement rates. For a replacement rate of 10%, for example, liquidity-
constrained agents would be willing to pay about 1.2% of their steady-state consumption to
eliminate all business cycle ﬂuctuations.
The numbers reported above neglect the transition to the new steady state. However, similar
patterns emerge when taking the transition path into account when computing the welfare costs.
For example, for a 40% replacement rate, the welfare costs for the family are 0.24% of steady-
state consumption, and for the liquidity-constrained workers they are 0.25% of steady-state
aversion of consumers is increased, the precautionary savings eﬀect starts to dominate. Even abstracting from
the movements in mean unemployment and capital, however, mean output in the economy would be aﬀected.
The reason is that output is convex in productivity and employment. Since productivity and employment co-
move positively, the economy with business cycles will have higher output than the economy without business
cycles, as mentioned by Krusell and Smith (1999), curbing the costs of business cycles. Similarly, even keeping
the mean rates of employment and capital constant, the equilibrium rental rates and wages would be aﬀected,
since they are not linear in capital and employment. For example, the rental rate of capital is a concave
function of the labor/capital ratio, cf. (8). Over the cycle this ratio mainly moves because of movements
in labor input. The average rental rate of capital therefore is lower in the presence of the cycle than in its
absence, and the opposite holds for the price of labor, xt, and thus for wages.
44 Also, unemployment of the low-skilled workers in our model and our calibration is more sensitive to the business
cycle. Our calibration relies on small proﬁts for ﬁrms in order to generate the cyclicality of unemployment for
both types of workers. As a result, mean proﬁts are sensitive to changes in wages and hours worked, which
diﬀer among the two groups of workers for the reasons explained above. Proﬁts drive job-ﬁnding rates, which
in turn drive mean unemployment. Consequently, with wages and hours being less sensitive to the business
cycle for the liquidity-constrained, mean unemployment rates in this group are relatively more aﬀected by the
cycle.
28consumption. For a 10% replacement rate the costs are 0.22% and 0.89% for the family and the
liquidity-constrained workers, respectively.
The next section shows that these mean eﬀects combine with skill transitions to also induce
lower average skills in the economy.
5.1 Mean skills when there are persistent earnings losses upon separation
It is well-documented that workers can face severe and long-lasting earnings losses once they
are displaced. For example, Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993) estimate the long-term
earnings losses of high-tenured workers in Philadelphia who were displaced. They ﬁnd that
workers aﬀected by mass layoﬀs lose on average 40-50% of their pre-displacement earnings in
the ﬁrst quarter of displacement. Even 6 years after this displacement, earnings for these workers
are on average 25% lower than their pre-displacement earnings. In addition, these losses are
counter-cyclical.45 Farber (2005) uses the Displaced Workers Survey through 2004 and ﬁnds
that the longer-term change in earnings between two full-time jobs for displaced workers is
about 11% on average. These losses are counter-cyclical with a standard deviation of about 3
percentage points. Krebs (2007) uses these facts to specify an exogenous process for income
after displacement and shows that cyclical variations in long-term earnings losses of displaced
workers can generate sizable costs of business cycles.46
In this section we also allow for such longer-term earnings losses. Toward this end, we allow for
diﬀerences in skills and calibrate the transition matrices as follows: Workers who are employed
are increasingly likely to have acquired better skills over time. They do not lose these skills if
they remain employed. For a worker with bad productivity, it takes on average four years (48




1/48 1 − 1/48

.
45 Costs emerge also for younger workers with less tenure. Fairlie and Kletzer (2003) look at the costs of
displacement for young adult workers. They ﬁnd that ﬁve years after the initial job loss, annual earnings are
about as high as in the absence of the initial displacement, yet this level is about 10% lower than it would
have been, absent any unemployment spells.
46 Krebs (2007) mainly focuses on permanent earnings losses. However, he also discusses a model with tenure
heterogeneity and earnings recovery after job displacement. His model is similar to the model entertained
here, in that it features two tenure states. Similar to our results, he ﬁnds that costs of business cycles are
higher for workers with longer tenure. The social cost of business cycles in his model is not much aﬀected,
however. Our paper diﬀers from his in making clear that this depends very much on the degree of insurance
available to the worker, and in highlighting that there can be important mean eﬀects through changing the
average composition of skills in the economy.
29Upon unemployment, workers lose their good skills with a certain, positive probability. We look
at two cases. In the ﬁrst case, most of the gains in productivity over a worker’s employment
spell are worker-speciﬁc. Once entering unemployment, the worker loses these skills only slowly,







In the above example, the cost of a job loss varies over the business cycle to the extent that the
longer the unemployment spell is, the more likely is the worker to lose his skills. In order to match
the sizable long-run costs of unemployment, we set ω = .3. An average worker (averaged over
good and bad types) who is displaced loses about 26% of his annual earnings when reemployed
only after an unemployment spell of exactly a year, which is in line with Keane and Wolpin
(1997).47 Also, in the model, ﬁve years after any displacement, a worker with good productivity
before displacement who ﬁnds himself in employment again, on average, has earnings that are
12.3% below his pre-displacement earnings. Krebs (2007) stresses that it is important that the
earnings losses from unemployment are higher in recessions than they are in booms. Our model
induces such ﬂuctuations in the longer-term earnings losses. In the above calibration, long-run
earnings losses have a standard deviation of 13% relative to their mean. The minimum and the
maximum of the longer-run costs of displacement diﬀer on average 20% from the mean. While
sizable, this is only about half the ﬂuctuation reported by Farber (2005)48 and also falls short
of the 40% ﬂuctuation calibrated by Krebs (2007). Apart from the skill transition matrices, our
calibration uses the same targets as in Table 1.49 The left-most panel of Figure 4 reports the
associated welfare costs of business cycles. For the liquidity-constrained workers, the costs of
business cycles rise by about 1 percentage point above the baseline.50 This is notably bigger
47 Keane and Wolpin (1997) estimate that skills of white-collar workers depreciate by 30% for each year of
unemployment (absence from white-collar work). For blue-collar workers the number is 9.6%.
48 Figure 12 in Farber (2005) implies a mean of earnings losses of 11% and a standard deviation of 30%. The
minimum and maximum costs diﬀer 45% from the mean costs.
49 Appendix C presents details about the steady state and about second moments.
50 In our calibration, we set the strike value as the same share of earnings for the low- and high-skilled fractions
(but diﬀerent for the family and the liquidity-constrained workers). It turns out that as a result, the unem-
ployment rates among workers with bad skills are more volatile (11.1%/11.8% for the savers/spenders) than
the unemployment rates among workers with good skills (7.0%/6.5%). The job-ﬁnding probabilities behave
very similarly in response to shocks in each of the two skill groups in the model. Nevertheless, b skill unem-
ployment is more persistent, as there are also inﬂows from good skills to bad skills. As a result, while the
unemployment hazard for the individual by and large is not aﬀected by the skill group he is in, the volatility
of the unemployment rates of the two skill groups is aﬀected and so is the gap between the unemployment
risk with or without business cycles.
30Figure 4: Business cycle costs with skill losses
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Notes: The panels show the welfare costs of business cycles (in percent of steady-state con-
sumption) for log-utility (σ = 1) for alternative replacement rates of unemployment insurance




liq) varies along the x-axis. Shown is the case of two diﬀerent sizes of skill
losses from unemployment. Left, unemployed workers who enter unemployment with good
skills face a 90% chance of retaining them (transition matrix P
u). Right, the chance is just
5% (transition matrix P
u′
). The black line and black diamonds show the welfare costs for
the family in the baseline and under the skill loss scenario, respectively. The red squares and
circles show the welfare costs for the average liquidity-constrained worker in the baseline and
under the skill loss scenario.
than the number of 0.2% reported in Krebs (2007), in particular when bearing in mind that our
calibration features lower long-run earnings losses. This rests on the fact that in our model the
business cycle induces considerable shifts in means that fall mainly on the liquidity-constrained
workers. Table 6 shows that unemployment rates for liquidity-constrained consumers increase
by 8% (0.4 pp.) above the steady-state level for workers with good skills and by almost 15%
(1.2pp) for workers with bad skills.
Importantly, the rise in unemployment and thus unemployment duration also works to reduce
the share of workers with good skills. In the family, the share of workers with bad skills is on
average 0.34% (0.07 pp.) larger than in the steady state. Among liquidity-constrained workers,
who in the calibrated model suﬀer the biggest increase in unemployment induced by the cycle,
there are almost 7% (1.4 pp.) more workers with lower skills than in the absence of business cycle
ﬂuctuations. As before, results are qualitatively not aﬀected by accounting for the transition
period. With a 40% replacement rate, the welfare costs of business cycles are 0.13% and 0.84%
for the family and the liquidity-constrained worker; and .12% and 1.55% when replacement rates
31Table 6: Mean eﬀects with slow skill losses, Pu
Output and consumption Share of skills among Hours per worker




















Capital, and employment Unemployment rates Wages and rental rates






















b 14.93 wt -.10
Unemployment Job-ﬁnding rates x .028
ufam
g -.04 sfam














Notes: The table shows percentage deviations of the means of selected variables from the
non-stochastic steady state when skills evolve according to P
u and P
e. The values refer to
a 40% replacement rate (corresponding to the left-most panel in Figure 4). Left from top
to bottom: output, consumption of a family member, average consumption of a liquidity-
constrained consumer, and consumption of an employed liquidity-constrained worker (good and
bad skills); capital, no. of employed workers (each for good and bad skills); no. of unemployed
(each for good and bad skills). Center column: share of good and bad skills in the family and
among liquidity-constrained workers; unemployment rates by skill group (family and liquidity-
constrained), job-ﬁnding rates by skill group. Right column: hours per employed worker for
the family and for liquidity-constrained workers of each type, hourly wages for the groups, wt
denotes the aggregate average hourly wage rate, rental rate of capital.
are only 10%.
The right-hand panel instead focuses on a second case, in which much of a worker’s gained
productivity is ﬁrm-speciﬁc, and so workers have a very high (95%) probability of losing these








In this example, workers lose their skills with a 95% probability in every month of unemploye-
ment. Though becoming unemployed is more costly in this scenario, it barely implies higher
costs of business cycles than the baseline. Intuitively, when skills depreciate faster, there is not
32much interaction of this skill loss with the business cycle. Instead one compares an economy
with ﬂuctuations to a steady state in which workers also become unemployed from time to time,
and in which they therefore also occasionally lose their skills to about the same degree in the
cyclical economy. In sum, variation of human capital with the business cycle by itself does not
generate costs of business cycles.
6 Conclusions
This paper developed an otherwise standard real business cycle model with Mortensen and Pis-
sarides (1994) search and matching frictions and asset-holding as well as liquidity-constrained
consumers. We calibrated the model to US data and used it to compute the cost of business
cycles. We computed the cost for diﬀerent degrees of the eﬀectiveness of governmental unem-
ployment beneﬁt schemes and also allowed for interactions of the skills of workers with their
employment state to cause longer-term earnings losses upon separation. Importantly, we let the
model govern how both the ﬂuctuations and the levels of idiosyncratic labor market risk change
when the business cycle risk is eliminated.
General equilibrium eﬀects apart, in the model unemployment ﬂuctuations by themselves do not
have any implications for the cost of business cycles. Nevertheless, even our lowest estimates for
the costs of business cycles are an order of magnitude larger than the estimates provided by Lucas
(1987). This is due to the fact that besides ﬂuctuations in unemployment and consumption,
which have been the focus of the previous literature, the model also implies signiﬁcantly higher
mean unemployment rates in the presence of a business cycle. These mean eﬀects arise as a
direct consequence of the non-linearity between unemployment and the job-ﬁnding probability
in the employment-ﬂow equation. Costs of business cycles therefore arise even for workers who
are well-insured against idiosyncratic ﬂuctuations in income and unemployment risk. Reducing
business cycle ﬂuctuations reduces average unemployment risk and increases welfare. For a
40% replacement rate of unemployment insurance, for instance, we ﬁnd that both liquidity-
constrained consumers and consumers with asset holdings, who are well insured against shortfalls
of consumption when unemployed, would be willing to forgo about 0.35% of their steady-state
consumption in order to avoid the cycle. These costs rise above 1 percent for liquidity-constrained
workers with only a 10% replacement rate.
We then assessed the costs of business cycles when unemployment spells increase the risk of losing
33skills acquired through previous work experience. In our calibrated model, the interaction of
skills and business cycle shocks is quantitatively important when skills are worker-speciﬁc rather
than job-speciﬁc. In the former case the business cycle increases not only average unemployment
risk, but the ensuing longer average duration of unemployment also implies that workers are
lower-skilled on average. For the liquidity-constrained workers, and for a 40% replacement rate,
the welfare costs more than triple to 1.3 percent of steady-state consumption.
Our estimates of the costs of cycles focused on the cycle’s eﬀect on average employment and
skills while we clearly have omitted further sources for costly business cycles. Most important to
us, a number of authors have pointed out that the risk of infrequent disasters linked to cyclical
phenomena signiﬁcantly raises the costs of business cycles. These authors typically appeal to
a (once in a lifetime) Great Depression scenario; see Chatterjee and Corbae (2007) and Salyer
(2007). In the current paper, we not only abstract from such aggregate disasters, but in the same
vein we limit the damage that unemployment can do to skills. In particular, regardless of the
length of the unemployment spell, in the paper, skills never fall below a certain level. Business
cycles would be more costly if very long-term unemployment – which is much more likely to
occur when there are lasting deep recessions – were associated with a very deep (disastrous) loss
of skills, or with the absence of any unemployment insurance. Needless to say that this would
point to even higher costs of business cycles.
In sum, we found that a standard model with labor market frictions implies that business cycles
increase mean unemployment risk and that they reduce the skill level of the workforce. Ac-
cording to this, business cycles are considerably more costly than the mere degree of aggregate
ﬂuctuations suggests, and these costs aﬀect a wide range of consumers (in the model, all con-
sumers). For future work, it would be interesting to investigate to what extent speciﬁc economic
policies could achieve some of the potential stabilization gains. We currently investigate the
implications in an estimated New Keynesian model for the US economy. In that economy both
demand and supply shocks are prevalent, so monetary and ﬁscal stabilization policy become
meaningful.
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A Measuring the welfare costs of business cycles
We compute the welfare costs of business cycles in terms of the consumption that consumers
would be willing to forgo if business cycle ﬂuctuations would be eliminated. We report these costs
as a percentage share of steady-state consumption. This section illustrates the measurement for
the simple model of Section 2. The worker’s value when employed, We,t, is given by
We,t = u(wt) + β(1 − ϑ)Et {We,t+1} + βϑEt {Wu,t+1},
where Wu,t is the worker’s value when unemployed in t. This value is
Wu,t = u(I) + βstEt {We,t+1} + β(1 − st)Et {Wu,t+1}.
Let Wu(γ) be the welfare of an unemployed worker when there are no business cycles and when
a share, γ, is deducted from actual consumption in that economy in all periods. Similarly, let
We(γ) be the counterfactual welfare for an employed worker when the same share, γ, of steady-
state consumption has been deducted. The corresponding expressions for the log-utility case,
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The welfare costs of business cycles are computed ex ante, not knowing the state of the economy
or the individual state of employment. More precisely, we average over individual employment
states and over all states of the economy by equating52
E {etWe,t + utWu,t} ≡ eWe(γ) + uWu(γ) ⇒ γ. (12)
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52 Most of the results presented in the paper rely on (12). This abstracts from the welfare costs/gains on
the transition path to the non-stochastic steady state. Results that include these transition dynamics are
computationally more demanding. We therefore report these results only occasionally. If we do, we draw
37B Intuition for the eﬀects on mean unemployment
This Appendix provides intuition for the mean eﬀects on unemployment that we observe in
the paper. The ﬁrst subsection motivates in a simpliﬁed framework without capital, liquidity-
constrained consumers and the intensive margin, why – general equilibrium eﬀects aside – mean
job-ﬁnding rates roughly move in sync with productivity. The second subsection shows that in
that framework, this is exactly the case for risk-neutral consumers. Combining this with the job
ﬂow equation generates mean unemployment that is higher than in the non-stochastic steady
state; see the intuition surrounding employment ﬂow equation (1). For the special case, a closed-
form formula for mean unemployment is presented. Starting from this, the third subsection
explains why mean unemployment rates of the liquidity-constrained workers are more strongly
aﬀected by the cycle than for workers in the family; wealth eﬀects play the main role. The
fourth subsection explains why, in our calibration, wages of liquidity-constrained workers react
less to the cycle, and links this to the former points.
B.1 Mean eﬀects in the search and matching model
Section 2 highlighted the idea that having higher mean unemployment rates is natural when-
ever mean job-ﬁnding rates are not aﬀected by the cycle. This section argues that – general
equilibrium mean eﬀects aside – mean job-ﬁnding rates are not much aﬀected by the cycle,
indeed.
To make this point, we abstract from the intensive margin, liquidity constraints and skill transi-
tions and assume that labor is the only factor of production, so xt = 1, and productivity is the
only shock. Wages then are given by the convex combination of productivity and the bargaining
outside option, strike,
wt = ηAt + (1 − η)strike,
where η is the worker’s bargaining power, and At is productivity. The equilibrium value of a
ﬁrm is given by
Jt = At − wt + (1 − ϑ)Et {βt,t+1Jt+1}
= (1 − η)(At − strike) + (1 − ϑ)Et {βt,t+1Jt+1}.
Abstracting from ﬂuctuations in the stochastic discount factor βt,t+1, the value of a ﬁrm is linear




S = 1000 states out of the non-stochastic steady state and use these as initial conditions to compute the
welfare in the non-stochastic economy, withdrawing a share γ from consumption in each contingency. We then
compute the value of γ which solves
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where ˜ We,s is the counterfactual value of an employed worker when the initial state is s, and the economy is
non-stochastic. Similarly, ˜ Wu,s, es, and us are evaluated at state s.
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where Υ is constant. In our calibration, ξ = .5, so that – abstracting from ﬂuctuations of the
pricing kernel and other general equilibrium eﬀects – the job-ﬁnding rate is proportional to
expected proﬁts. To the extent that proﬁts are linear in productivity, At, job-ﬁnding rates are
also a linear function of productivity. Business cycle ﬂuctuations that do not alter the mean of
productivity therefore approximately will not alter the mean of the job-ﬁnding rate. In turn, by
the job-ﬂow equation, this means that mean unemployment rises; see Section 2.
B.2 A special case: linear utility
The above results can be made more precise for the special case of linear utility, σ = 0:
Proposition 2. In a simpliﬁed version of our model, in which labor is the only factor of pro-
duction, productivity is the only shock, there is no intensive margin, all workers live in the
family and there are no skill diﬀerences, and in which utility is linear in consumption, the fol-
lowing holds if ξ = 0.5: (i) the job-ﬁnding rate is linear in productivity, st = s + φs(At − A),
φs = Υβρ
1−η
1−(1−ϑ)βρ, (ii) the unemployment rate, up to a second-order approximation, has a
mean of
E {ut} = u +
φ2
s




1 − ρ2 σ2
A. (14)
In words: whenever there is persistence in productivity shocks ρ > 0, mean unemployment
rates in the cyclical economy exceed the steady-state level, and increasingly so the more volatile
innovations to productivity are (the higher σA).
Proof. With linear utility, βt,t+1 = β. Guess and verify yields that the value of the ﬁrm is
Jt =
1 − η
1 − (1 − ϑ)β
(A − strike) +
1 − η
1 − (1 − ϑ)βρ
(At − A).
Using this, and ξ = 0.5, (13) yields that
st = s + φs(At − A), (15)
where s collects the constant terms and φs = Υβρ
1−η
1−(1−ϑ)βρ, so the job-ﬁnding rate is exactly
linear in productivity, and its mean is not aﬀected by cyclical ﬂuctuations if the mean of At is
not aﬀected. This proves part (i).
Regarding (ii), since ut = 1 − et, the employment-ﬂow equation (1) yields
ut+1 = (1 − ϑ)ut + ϑ − stut.
39Rewriting this, and using (15), we have that
˜ ut+1 = (1 − ϑ − s)˜ ut − φs ˜ At˜ ut − φsu ˜ At, (16)
where a tilde marks deviations from steady state, e.g., ˜ ut = ut − u. Taking unconditional
expectations, using the stationarity of the model and that for technology E{ ˜ At} = 0, we have
that
E {˜ ut} = −
1
ϑ + s
φsE{˜ ut ˜ At}. (17)
In order to obtain an expression for E{˜ ut ˜ At}, multiply (16) by ˜ At+1, and expand the right-hand
side by using ˜ At+1 = ρ ˜ At + ǫA
t+1. A second-order approximation of the resulting terms yields
˜ ut+1 ˜ At+1 ≈ (1 − ϑ − s)
 
ρ˜ ut ˜ At + ˜ utǫA
t+1
 
− φsuρ ˜ A2
t − φs ˜ AtuǫA
t+1.
Taking unconditional expectations and using stationarity again, we have that up to second order
E{˜ ut ˜ At} ≈ −
1





Using this with (17) yields the expression (14), which proves (ii).
B.3 The calibration, and the cyclicality of wages and proﬁts
In our calibration, steady-state proﬁts are higher for ﬁrms with liquidity-constrained workers
than they are for ﬁrms with workers who live in the family. Nevertheless, proﬁts – and thus job-
ﬁnding rates – of the two groups are about equally volatile. This has to do with the ﬂexibility
of wages over the cycle, which in turn depends on the bargaining setup, as this section explains.
Again ignoring the intensive margin and ﬂuctuations in the price of labor, the family’s wage
ﬁrst-order condition is given by
η(At − wfam
t ) = (1 − η)(wfam
t − strikefam).
The ﬁrst-order condition for the liquidity-constrained worker (assuming log-utility) is
η(At − w
liq













































40So, everything else equal, two observations are in order. First, the wage rate for liquidity-
constrained workers will react less to technology and will thus be less volatile over the cycle. Note
that this is actually borne out by Tables 4, 8 and 10. Notice also that, all else equal, liquidity-
constrained workers will accept lower earnings. As a result of the eﬀect described above, in a
recession, wages of liquidity-constrained workers will not fall by as much as for workers in the
family. This reduces the incentives to create jobs for liquidity-constrained workers more strongly
than for the family. The opposite holds in booms. This leads to larger ﬂuctuations in job-ﬁnding
rates for the liquidity-constrained workers for any given level of steady-state proﬁts of the labor
ﬁrms. It thereby explains why proﬁts of ﬁrms that employ liquidity-constrained workers can
be larger in the steady state in our calibration (cp. Tables 2, 7, and 9), while nevertheless the
ﬂuctuations in job-ﬁnding rates and thus unemployment are similar for the two groups.
41C Steady state and second moments for skill loss calibrations
C.1 Long-term earnings losses upon separation, slow skill loss P u
Table 7: Implied Steady State, skill loss Pu
Per capita consumption(1) Hours worked when employed and wages










e,g .70 constr., empl., good skill. h .33 .24 .29 .29 hours per worker.
c
liq
e,b .38 constr., empl., bad skill. w 2.46 1.32 2.43 1.31 hourly wage.
c
liq
u,g .28 constr., unempl., good skill. Labor market - stocks and ﬂows
c
liq
u,b .15 constr., unempl., bad skill. e .75 .19 .75 .19 employment.
Income side of GDP u .039 .017 .039 .017 unemployment.
whn/y .66 labor income to GDP. urate .050 .083 .050 .083 unempl. rate (avg: .057).
rkk/y .33 capital share. v .047 .028 .047 .028 vacancies.
Ψ/y .001 proﬁt share. s .40 .40 .40 .40 probability of ﬁnding a job.
Use of output Share of skills in family/liq.-constrained group
i/y .24 investment output ratio. skills .79 .21 .79 .21 share of skills.
c/y .56 (non-dur. +services)/output. Labor market - proﬁts of labor ﬁrms, strike values
g/y .19 government cons. /output. Ψ
l .025 .025 .071 .071 proﬁt to output ratio
κv/y .0055 vacancy costs to output. strike .53 .21 .49 .26 strike values
Notes: Selected features of the steady state for the model with slow skill loss when unemployed, which underlies
the left panel of Figure 4. All values refer to a monthly frequency.
(1) The steady-state values for consumption depend on the values of the replacement rate (through the income
when unemployed for the constrained workers, and through taxes for the family). The values reported here pertain
to a 40% replacement rate (
I
wh = .40).
42Table 8: Standard deviations, skill loss Pu
Per capita consumption(1) Hours worked when employed and wages










e,g .30 constr., empl., good. h .11 .11 .07 .07 hours per worker.
c
liq
e,b .30 constr., empl., bad. w .30 .30 .23 .23 hourly wage.
Aggregate GDP components Labor market - stocks and ﬂows
y .89 output. e .61 1.6 .59 1.7 employment.
c .50 consumption. u 6.9 11.9 6.2 13.6 unemployment.
i 2.4 investment. urate 7.0 11.1 6.4 11.8 unempl. rate.
Aggr. hours, wages, labor mkt v 13.7 9.6 11.4 9.4 vacancies.
htet .49 total hours s 9.8 8.5 8.2 8.0 job-ﬁnding prob.
wthtet .75 total wages Share of skills in family/liq.-constrained group
wt .31 wage rate skills .41 1.5 .41 1.5 share of skills.
ut 8.2 unemployment
vt 11.7 vacancies
st 9.1 job-ﬁnd rate
Notes: Percent standard deviations for the model with slow skill loss when unemployed, which underlies the
left panel of Figure 4.
43C.2 Long-term earnings losses upon separation, rapid skill loss P u′
Table 9: Implied Steady State, skill loss Pu′
Per capita consumption(1) Hours worked when employed and wages










e,g .84 constr., empl., good skill. h .33 .24 .27 .27 hours per worker.
c
liq
e,b .45 constr., empl., bad skill. w 3.19 1.72 3.15 1.69 hourly wage.
c
liq
u,g .33 constr., unempl., good skill. Labor market - stocks and ﬂows
c
liq
u,b .18 constr., unempl., bad skill. e .44 .50 .44 .50 employment.
Income side of GDP u .011 .046 .011 .046 unemployment.
whn/y .66 labor income to GDP. urate .024 .083 .024 .083 unempl. rate (avg: .057).
rkk/y .33 capital share. v .0007 .074 .0007 .074 vacancies.
Ψ/y .001 proﬁt share. s .40 .40 .40 .40 probability of ﬁnding a job.
Use of output Share of skills in family/liq.-constrained group
i/y .24 investment output ratio. skills .45 .55 .45 .55 share of skills.
c/y .56 (non-dur. +services)/output. Labor market - proﬁts of labor ﬁrms, strike values
g/y .19 government cons. /output. Ψ
l .013 .005 .021 .011 proﬁt to output ratio
κv/y .0083 vacancy costs to output. strike .68 .27 .58 .31 strike values
Notes: Selected features of the steady state for the model with rapid skill loss when unemployed, which underlies
the right panel of Figure 4. All values refer to a monthly frequency.
(1) The steady-state values for consumption depend on the values of the replacement rate (through income when
unemployed for the constrained workers and through taxes for the family). The values reported here pertain to a
40% replacement rate (
I
wh = .40).
44Table 10: Standard deviations, skill loss Pu′
Per capita consumption(1) Hours worked when employed and wages










e,g .36 constr., empl., good. h .13 .13 .09 .09 hours per worker.
c
liq
e,b .36 constr., empl., bad. w .34 .34 .27 .27 hourly wage.
Aggregate GDP components Labor market - stocks and ﬂows
y .89 output. e .25 .87 .25 .87 employment.
c .44 consumption. u .20 10.2 .27 10.3 unemployment.
i 2.4 investment. urate 7.0 10.1 .18 10.1 unempl. rate.
Aggr. hours, wages, labor mkt v 20.7 11.2 18.0 10.4 vacancies.
htet .50 total hours s 9.8 8.9 8.6 8.3 job-ﬁnding prob.
wthtet .69 total wages Share of skills in family/liq.-constrained group
wt .31 wage rate skills .3 .2 .3 .2 share of skills.
ut 8.2 unemployment
vt 11.2 vacancies
st 8.8 job-ﬁnd rate
Notes: Percent standard deviations for the model with rapid skill loss when unemployed, which underlies
the right panel of Figure 4.
45Table 11: Mean eﬀects with rapid skill losses, Pu′
Output and consumption Share of skills among Hours per worker




















Capital, and employment Unemployment rates Wages and rental rates






















b 11.82 wt -.017
Unemployment Job-ﬁnding rates x .023
ufam
g -.28 sfam














Notes: The table shows percentage deviations of the means of selected variables from the
non-stochastic steady state when skills evolve according to P
u′
and P
e. The values refer
to a 40% replacement rate (corresponding to the right-most panel in Figure 4. Left from
top to bottom: output, consumption of a family member, average consumption of a liquidity-
constrained consumer, and consumption of an employed liquidity-constrained worker (good and
bad skills); capital, no. of employed workers (each for good and bad skills); no. of unemployed
(each for good and bad skills). Center column: share of good and bad skills in the family and
among liquidity-constrained workers; unemployment rates by skill group (family and liquidity-
constrained), job-ﬁnding rates by skill group. Right column: hours per employed worker for
the family and for liquidity-constrained workers of each type, hourly wages for the groups, wt
denotes the aggregate average hourly wage rate, rental rate of capital.
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